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The hedge fund industry has grown exponentially in the
pastfive years and is now an increasingly important part of
the national economy. In response to this growth, the
Securities and Exchange Commission recently implemented
a rule requiring certain hedge fund advisors to register
with the Commission. The first section of this Note takes an
in depth look at whether the Commission had the legal
authority to make the rule, whether the rule is necessary,
and whether the rule will be effective in achieving the goals
of gathering information and deterring fraud.
The second section of this Note examines some recent
investment strategies hedge fund advisers have utilized to
maximize return on investment. Specifically, the Note
analyzes how certain hedge fund advisers have used proxy
contests to oust incumbent directors and influence
corporate strategy while avoiding corporate anti-takeover
devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The hedge fund industry has grown exponentially in the past five
years and is now an increasingly important part of the national economy.
The growth and development of the hedge fund industry is catching the
attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and is now
leading to unique investment strategies that have never before been utilized.
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This Note takes an in-depth look at the SEC's response to the increasing
growth of the hedge fund industry and also examines some recent
investment strategies hedge fund advisers have utilized to influence
corporate strategy.
The first section of this paper analyzes the recent rule adopted by
the SEC that requires the registration of certain hedge fund advisers with
the SEC, subjecting these advisers to various reporting requirements,
compliance requirements, and potential examination by the SEC. The
primary concerns here are whether the SEC has the legal authority to adopt
such a rule, whether such a rule is necessary, and whether the rule will be
effective in achieving the SEC's goals of gathering information and
deterring fraud.
The second section of this Note examines a category of hedge fund
investing that pursues corporate policy changes in order to create returns for
the investment. What makes this method of hedge fund activity unique is
the way in which fund managers utilize long-standing investment
techniques. Meanwhile, these fund managers are able to maneuver around
a Shareholders' Rights Plan and initiate a successful proxy contest to
influence dissenting management. To analyze how hedge funds are utilized
in this manner, however, it is first necessary to have a general
understanding of hedge funds. The following section provides a basic
description.
II. WHAT ARE HEDGE FUNDS?
Hedge funds have no statutory or regulatory definition, but they do
have some common characteristics. Generally, hedge funds are
"sophisticated pools of assets that are not marketed and are typically open
only to wealthy investors."1 Professional investment managers, who have a
significant stake in the funds they manage and receive a management fee,
including a substantial share of the performance of the fund, usually
2organize them. Because adviser fees are tied to the performance of the
fund, there is a greater incentive for advisers to use risky investment
techniques to enhance the fund's performance, thus boosting their fees.3
Furthermore, hedge funds have typically been organized and operated in a
way that avoids regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940.4
1 Stephen Labaton, Judges Weigh Hedge Funds vs. the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2005, at C1.
2 William Fung and David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. OF EMPIRICAL FIN.
309, 310 (1999).
'See Jonathon H. Gatsik, Note, Hedge Funds: The Ultimate Game of Liar's Poker, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 591, 595 (2001) (referring solely to the use of leverage for
enhancing fund performance, but the same reasoning supports any investment technique
which relies upon the fund increasing risk to increase profit).
4 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), 80a-3(c)(7) (2004).
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Hedge funds were originally designed to invest in equity securities
and used leverage and short selling to "hedge" the portfolio's exposure to
movements in equity markets.' But today, hedge funds use a wide variety
of methods designed to maximize returns.6 Examples of such methods are
shorting stocks and bonds and investing in convertible securities, futures,
and options.' An in-depth discussion of a variety of different hedge fund
investment strategies is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Rather,
our analysis begins with the recent rule by the SEC requiring the
registration of certain hedge fund advisers.
III. DOES THE SEC HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE




The Investment Adviser Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act") has several
basic requirements for certain investment advisers that meet established
thresholds: registration with the SEC, maintenance of certain business
records, delivery of a disclosure statement to clients 8, and a prohibition
from defrauding clients due to a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of
clients. 9 Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act exempts from registration
those investment advisers who have had fewer than fifteen clients during
the preceding twelve months, do not hold themselves out generally to the
public as investment advisers, and are not advisers to any registered
5 See Carol J. Loomis, Hard Times Come to the Hedge Funds, FORTUNE, Jan. 1970, at
10.
6 See Bernstein Wealth Management Research, Hedge Fund Myths and Realities (Oct.
2002) at 3-4, available at https://www.bernstein.com/CmsObjectPC/pdfs/non-
indexed/HF MythRealities 0210.pdf.
7 See, e.g., The Presidents Working Group on Financial Markets, Report on Hedge
Funds, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management (1999) [hereafter Working
Group], at 4. (Convertible securities are investment contracts which contain a
convertible feature to a specified security ex ante.) See BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 54-
57 MCGRAW-HILL IRWIN (6th ed. 2005). Options are a contract right, allowing the
purchaser the right but not the obligation to buy an asset (call) or sell an asset (put) at a
predetermined price on or before a specified expiration date. Futures contracts call for
delivery of an asset (or in some case, its cash value) at a specified delivery or maturity
date for an agreed-upon price.
8 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, 72054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 275).
9 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963).
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investment company. 10 Those eligible for exemption still must comply with
the SEC's antifraud provision, but need not file registration forms
identifying themselves, maintain business records in accordance with SEC
rules, adopt compliance programs or codes of ethics, or subject themselves
to SEC oversight." Importantly, the SEC lacks authority to conduct § 204
examinations of exempt advisers. 12
Until recently, this exemption was utilized by hedge fund advisers
to avoid registration with the SEC under the "fifteen client" exception, as
the word "client" was interpreted to mean an investment pool rather than an
individual investor. 3 But the recent release of the SEC rule "Registration
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers" changes the
original interpretation of "client" as it pertains to hedge fund advisers.14 As
a result of the recent release, most hedge fund advisers will no longer be
exempt under § 203(b)(3) and will be required to register with the SEC.15The effective date of the new rule is February of 2006.16
2. The Process of the Rule Release
In 2002, the SEC requested a staff investigation of hedge funds
because of concerns due to: (1) the growth of hedge funds, (2) increased
involvement of hedge funds in fraud, and (3) broader investment in hedge
funds.' 7  After receiving the findings from this investigation, the SEC
proposed a rule in July 2004 requiring hedge fund advisers to count each
individual investor in a hedge fund, rather than the hedge fund itself, as a
client for purposes of the private adviser exemption."8 The proposed rule
was designed to extend the protections afforded by the Advisers Act to
investors in hedge funds and to generally enhance the SEC's ability to
protect the nation's securities markets.19
The SEC requested and received letters from 161 commentators
regarding the rule proposal, including investors, hedge fund advisers, other
10 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2002).
1 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72054.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 72054-72055.
14 Id. at 72058.
15 id.
16 See Labaton, supra note 1, at C1.
17 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72055.is Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72058.
19 Id.
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investment advisers, trade associations, and law firms.20 Forty-two of the
commentators were neutral regarding the proposal and offered insights into
specific issues21, thirty-six commentators (including some hedge fund
advisers) supported the proposal, 22  and eighty-three commentators
(including many unregistered hedge fund advisers) argued strongly against
the proposal, citing concerns about costs of compliance,23 questionable
effectiveness in preventing fraud,24 and the potential intrusiveness of the
oversight of hedge fund managers.25 In addition, some investors voiced
concern that advisers would pass the costs of registration onto them in the
form of increased management fees.26
On December 10, 2004, in a 3-2 decision, the SEC, led by its
chairman William H. Donaldson, released the final rule requiring certain
hedge funds to register with the SEC, with an effective date of February 10,
2006.27 The release of this rule has sparked much debate over whether the
SEC has the authority to make such a rule, whether the rule is necessary,
and whether the rule will be effective.
20 Comments on Proposed Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge
Fund Advisers, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004.shtml (last modified Mar.
21, 2005).
21 See, e.g., Letter from Van Hedge Fund Advisers to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the
SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/
van091504.pdf.
22 See, e.g., Letter from Ohio Public Employees Retirement System to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Aug. 6, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/
opers080604.pdf; Letter from New Jersey State Investment Council to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 17, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73004/oskramer091704.pdf.
23 See, e.g., Letter from Managed Funds Association to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of
the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/
jggaine091504.pdf; Letter from Madison Capital Management, LLC to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73004/bgordon091504.pdf.
24 See, e.g., Letter from Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/dhirschmann09l504.pdf ("Letter from
Chamber of Commerce"); Letter from International Swaps and Derivatives Association
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s73004/rgpickeO91504.pdf, ("Letter from ISDA").
25 See, e.g., Letter from Chamber of Commerce, supra note 24; Letter from ISDA,
supra note 24.
26 See, e.g., Letter from John Waller to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (July 3 1,
2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/jwaller6479.htm; Letter from Melissa
Kadiri to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/makadiri2294.htm.
27 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72054, 72076.
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B. The SEC's Legal Authority Under the Advisers Act
At issue is whether it is appropriate for the SEC to reinterpret the
meaning of the word "client" in the Advisers Act in relation to hedge funds
so that each individual investor in a fund, rather than the fund itself, will be
considered a "client" for the purposes of the Act. The statutory
interpretation of an administrative body, such as the SEC, is entitled to
deference when a statute is ambiguous. 28 But if the intent of Congress is
clear on the precise question at issue, the agency and the courts must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.29  The final
authority on matters of statutory construction is the judiciary, 30 and if a
court determines that Congress had an intention on the precise matter at
issue, the court must give effect to that intention as law. 3' The court must
reject any interpretation by an administrative body that is contrary to the
clear intent of Congress.32 Here, the relevant issue is whether Congress has
unambiguously spoken to the precise issue at question: the meaning of the
word "client" in the § 203(b)(3) exemption of the Advisers Act.
The SEC's basic argument to justify its interpretation is that the
new rule is consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting the §
203(b)(3) exemption, which was to create a limited exemption for advisers
whose activities were not national in scope and who provided advice to
family members or friends.33 Due to the recent growth of the hedge fund
industry, the activities of hedge fund advisers are now national in scope and
should arguably no longer qualify for this exemption. The term "client" is
not defined in the Act, nor does the word have one clear meaning.
34
Therefore, to the extent § 203 is ambiguous, the SEC has the authority to
interpret an exemption and adopt a rule that is reasonably related to the
35
statutory purpose.
28 Chevron, U.S.A.v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (citation
omitted).
29 id.
30 FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (citation
omitted).
31 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992).
32 SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978) (citation omitted).
33 See, e.g, Letter from Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 8, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73004/wilmer090804.pdf ("Letter from Wilmer Cutler"); Letter from Managed Funds
Association, supra note 23.
34 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) at 422 ("client"
means "a person under the protection of another" or "a person who engages the
professional advice or services of another").
31 See, Chevron at 843-44.
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1. The Applicability and Effect of Lowe
Those opposed to the new rule argue that Congress made it clear in
1940 that it intended to exempt from registration an adviser to one or more
funds, each of which was to count as only a single "client", and if that
principle is now to be replaced by a "look through" regime, only Congress
36has the authority to make that change. Several dissenting commentators
argue that the SEC is without statutory authority to make this amendment,
citing Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 210 (1985), in support of their
argument. In Lowe, the Court held that a publisher of a securities
newsletter was not an investment adviser under the Advisers Act because he
did not offer "individualized investment advice attuned to any specific
portfolio or to any client's particular needs."3  In the Lowe decision, the
Supreme Court relied heavily on the Investment Advisers Report, a 1939
Commission report that led to the Advisers Act in 1940. In this report, the
term "investment adviser" meant a professional who provided
individualized services to a client.38
Although Lowe offers a judicial interpretation of the Advisers Act,
it only deals implicitly with the definition of the term "client" in the Act.
Instead, the focus of the Court in Lowe was with the definition of
"investment adviser." Therefore, it is arguable that a different interpretation
of the word "client" by the SEC as proposed in the new rule is not
inconsistent with Lowe, as Lowe dealt only with the definition of the term
"investment adviser" and did not speak specifically to the interpretation of
the term "client" in the Advisers Act.
Furthermore, even if Lowe is found to be applicable to the
definition of "client," the SEC may still argue that many hedge fund
advisers now give individualized investment advice to their investors. 39 For
example, some hedge fund investors may have greater access to risk and
portfolio information, may be provided different lock-up periods, and may
be able to negotiate lower fees compared to other investors in the same
fund. 40  "Side pockets," in which assets are segregated, may operate to
provide different investors with different investment experiences. 41 Today,
each account of a hedge fund investor may bear many resemblances of
36 Letter from Wilmer Cutler, supra note 33.
37 See Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 208 (1985).
38 Investment Management, Investment Supervisory, and Investment Advisory Services,
Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 7 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1939) (statement of James White
of Scudder, Stevens and Clark).




94 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA W [Vol. 1:87
JOURNAL
separate investment accounts, which would typically be counted as separate
clients per § 203(b)(3). Therefore, even if the reasoning in Lowe is applied
to hedge fund advisers, the new rule may still be found to be permissible in
light of the individualized treatment of some hedge fund investors.
2. Amendments to the Advisers Act, the Safe Harbor of 1985, and
Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act
Dissenters argue that as Congress occasionally amended the
Advisers Act, it did so in a way that reiterated its understanding that a fund
counts only as a single client. The reasoning follows that if this principle is
now to be replaced by a "look-through" regime, it is up to Congress to
make that change. The SEC counters, however, by asserting that the
legislative history of the 1980 Amendment supports "looking through"
investment vehicles because Congress deliberately left open the question of
how to count clients for entities. 42  Language from the House Report
indicates that the 1980 Amendment is "not intended to suggest that each
shareholder, partner or beneficial owner of a company advised by such a
person or firm should or should not be regarded as a client of that person or
firm. ,, 43
The opposition's argument that Congressional acquiescence
throughout various amendments to the Advisers Act is the equivalent of a
Congressional mandate to maintain the current definition of "client" is not
particularly persuasive. Moreover, Congressional silence regarding the
definition of the term "client" throughout various amendments is not highly
determinative that Congress was adamant about maintaining the current
definition of "client" in the Act.
Dissenters argue that the SEC itself has consistently understood the
word "client" not to cover fund investors who were not themselves
advisees, as evidenced by the SEC's adoption of Rule 203(b)(3)-1 (the Safe
Harbor of 1985), which explicitly exempted hedge funds from
registration.44 Yet the SEC stated when it proposed the Safe Harbor of
1985 that "a different approach could be followed in counting clients. 45
Because of the change in capital markets and the exponential growth of
hedge funds, the SEC asserts that reexamination is now appropriate.46
Dissenters also argue that the legislative history of § 3(c)(7) of the
Investment Company Act indicates that Congress understood there would
be potentially large asset pools that would not be required to register with
42 H.R. REP. No. 96-1341, at 62-63 (1980).
43 id.
44 Definition of "Client" for Purposes Relating to Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg.
8740 (proposed July 7, 1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
45 id.
46 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72068.
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the SEC.47 Congress made the formation of large private pools easier by
adding § 3(c)(7) (the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996) to the Investment Company Act. This Act permits the formation of
unregistered pools of an unlimited number of qualified, or highly
sophisticated, investors. Congress passed this Act4 8 in recognition of "the
important role these pools can play in facilitating capital formation for U.S.
companies. '4 9  The Committee report faulted "regulatory restrictions on
these private pools" for driving American investors offshore.50 Dissenters
argue that Congress was well aware that many advisers to such pools were
not registered under the Advisers Act and that allowing them to continue in
their unregistered state was entirely consistent with Congress' objective of
minimizing regulatory restrictions on such pools of assets. 5'
Although the legislative history from the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 indicates that Congress was aware of the
important role that these asset pools play in the United States economy, the
retailization of hedge funds has changed the premise upon which § 3(c)(7)
was based. The notion that highly sophisticated investors are not in need of
regulation and protection by the SEC (because they are capable of
protecting themselves through their own expertise and resources) is the
basis for Section 3(c)(7). Since 1996, however, evidence suggests that
retailization of hedge funds has begun in the United States (and has been
occurring abroad for several years) 52 and less-sophisticated investors will
likely gain access to hedge fund investments. Thus, SEC regulation may be
deemed necessary to protect these less-sophisticated investors from the
risks and fee structures of hedge funds.
Given the retailization of hedge funds, it is not clear that requiring
the registration of hedge fund advisers is contrary to the intent of Congress
in its enactment of § 3(c)(7). Moreover, the addition of § 3(c)(7), which
excludes funds with sophisticated investors from the definition of an
"investment company," does not necessarily preclude the SEC from
interpreting the term "client" in the Advisers Act in a way that would
require registration of hedge funds.
47
Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearing on S. 3580 Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 7 6th Cong. 179 (1940) (statement
of David Schenker, Chief Counsel of the Investment Trust Study).
41 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(7) (2004).
49 S. Rep. No. 104-293, at 10 (1996).50 Id.
51 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72097.
52 Silvia Ascarelli and David Reilly, Hedge Funds Are Coming to the Masses, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 15, 2004.
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3. The Policy Behind the Rule
Perhaps after all of the debate surrounding the legislative
interpretation of the Advisers Act, what is more important is to give the
SEC the tools necessary to detect financial fraud and misappropriation.
53
The SEC has broad rulemaking authority under § 211(a) of the Advisers
Act to make rules "necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the functions
and powers conferred upon the Commission elsewhere in this subchapter..
" and "may classify persons and matters within its jurisdiction and
prescribe different requirements for different classes of persons or
matters. 54  Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act grants the SEC broad
authority to adopt rules that "define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. 5 5
Ultimately, the courts will decide whether the SEC's recent rule
will be permitted to stand. Phillip Goldstein, a hedge fund adviser from
Pleasantville, NY; Opportunity Partners, a hedge fund partnership; and its
general partner, Kimball & Winthrop have filed a lawsuit maintaining that
the SEC exceeded its authority in releasing the new rule.56 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is currently hearing the
case. 57 Presuming that the SEC will be found to have the authority to make
the rule, the questions then become whether the rule is necessary and
whether it will be effective.
C. The Needfor SEC Action
1. Growth of Hedge Funds
The SEC claims that the size and growth of the hedge fund industry
has brought about the need for the new rule. For example, estimates
indicate that the hedge fund industry has grown from about $50B in assets
in 1990 to nearly $1T in assets today. 58 Although some of the growth is
53 Labaton, supra note 1, at C1.
54 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(a) (1940).
55 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (1940).
56 See Labaton, supra note 1, at C1.
57 In what many would call a surprising opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia recently rejected the SEC's hedge fund rule as arbitrary and
unreasonable in light of the clear intent of Congress in the Advisers Act. Goldstein v.
S.E.C., No. 04-1434 (C.A.D.C. June 23, 2006),
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200606/04-1434a.pdf. The SEC
is currently evaluating its strategy in light of the Court's decision, and it is not yet clear
whether the SEC will petition the decision to the United States Supreme Court.
58 See Amey Stone, Hedge Funds Are Everyone's Problem, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 6,
2004, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2004/
nf2004086 0880 db042.htm.
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attributed to performance, the majority of the growth is from new capital. 59
The industry is growing faster than that of mutual funds and already equals
over one-fifth of the total equity of mutual funds.60
Dissenters of the rule argue that the $IT in assets estimated by the
SEC is still dwarfed by the approximately $23T currently under
61management by registered advisers. Moreover, dissenters argue that the
SEC should not necessarily increase its regulatory requirements on an
industry simply because it has grown.62
2. Growth in Hedge Fund Fraud
Over the last five years, the SEC has brought fifty-one cases of
hedge fund adviser fraud with aggregate amounts in issue exceeding
63$1.1B. Dissenters argue that many of those implicated in these cases have
too few assets to require registration; therefore the new rule would not have
had a significant deterring effect on this fraud.64  Although registration
would only cover roughly half of those violations due to a $30M in assets
floor, it would cover $1B, or almost the entire amount of the fraud.65
Opposing commentators quoted the 2003 Staff Hedge Fund Report
indicating that investigators found no evidence that hedge fund advisers
engaged disproportionately in fraudulent activity relative to other
investment advisers.6 6 For example, only three percent of all actions
brought by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in
2003 were against hedge funds or their advisers. 6' But this report was
prepared before the discovery of hedge fund involvement in the mutual
fund market timing scandal, in which the SEC identified 389 hedge funds
59 id.
60 See ICI Statements and Publications, Investment Company Institute, Mutual Funds
Hold 22 Percent Share of U.S. Retirement Market Assets (June 22, 2004),
http://www.ici.org/statements/nr/2004/04 news retire fund.html#TopOfPage.
61 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72054, at 72093.
62 id.
63 Id. at 72056.
64 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45172, 45197-45198 (proposed July 20,
2004) ("Proposed Release").
65 id.
66 Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, Staff Report to the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission ("Staff Report") (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf, at 73.
67 Testimony of Patrick J. McCarty, General Counsel of the CFTC, before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (July 15, 2004), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/ files/mccarty.pdf, at 1.
98 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 1:87
JOURNAL
68
involved in the scandal. Moreover, the SEC rejects the argument that it
should wait until hedge funds do comprise a disproportionate share of
fraudulent activity before it should act.
3. Broader Exposure to Hedge Funds
There has been growing hedge fund exposure to smaller investors.69
This may be at least partially due to the fact that some hedge funds'
minimum investment requirements have decreased over time.70 Outside of
the U.S., many hedge fund advisers have already sought to market
themselves to smaller investors. 7 1 Additionally, development of funds to
contribute to hedge funds has made hedge funds more readily available to
investors.7 2 Currently, funds of hedge funds represent 20% of hedge fund
capital 73 and are the fastest growing source of capital for hedge funds,
increasing 50% since January 1997 (from 16% to 24%).
74
The dissent argues that the 2003 Staff Hedge Fund Report found no
retailization.7 5 In addition, the dissent argues, the SEC's concern regarding
retail investors' exposure to funds of hedge funds is baseless because the
investment minimums for these funds are typically between $25K and
$IM.
76
The dissent and commentators suggest three alternatives to
universal registration to address the retailization issue: (1) requiring funds
6' Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72057.
69 See Staff Report, supra note 66, at 81.70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Robert Murray, Vega To Target Smaller Investors, Alternative Investment
News, Aug 20, 2004 (Spanish hedge fund adviser plans to offer a fund of its hedge
funds to U.S. investors); see Financial Services Authority, The CIS Sourcebook-A New
Approach, Feedback on CP185 and Made Text, Mar. 2004, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/04-07.pdf (last visited on Oct. 25, 2004); see FSA
May Lift Ban on Hedge Fund Retail Investors, Reuters, Sept. 29, 2004, available at
http://www.reuters.co.uk (last visited on Sept. 29, 2004); see Ascarelli and Reilly, supra
note 52; see Commission des Operations de Bourse (France), Regulating Alternative
Multi-Management Investments, News Release (Apr. 1 2003) available in File No. S7-
30-04; see Matheson Ornsby Prentice, Establishing a Hedge Fund in Ireland, 2003,
available at http://www.mop.ie/fileupload/publications (last visited on Oct. 25, 2004);
see Matthew Harrison, Fund Management in Hong Kong and Singapore, CSU Research
and Policy, Jan. 6, 2003.
72 Jane Bryant Quinn and Temma Ehrenfeld, The Street's Latest Lure: Some One Is
Going to Mint Money With the New Hedge Funds For Smaller Investors, NEWSWEEK,
May 26, 2003, at 62.
7, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., The Hedge Fund Industry-Products, Services, or
Capabilities, Bernstein Research Call, May 19, 2003, at 18.
74 See Hennessee Group LLC, lOth Annual Manager Survey, (2004).
75 Staff Report, supra note 66, at 80.76 Id. at 69.
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of funds targeted to retail investors to register; 77 (2) prohibiting funds from
being publicly offered; or (3) placing heightened restrictions on investors. 8
Some commentators also voice concern that mandatory registration may
actually accelerate the retailization of hedge funds, because the public may
perceive registration with the SEC as a stamp of approval on the hedge
funds. 9
In addition to retailization, the SEC was also concerned that a
growing number of pension funds, universities, endowments, foundations,
and other charitable organizations have begun to invest or have increased
their investments in hedge funds, with the total of institutional investing
growing from $60B in 1998 to $254B in 2004.80
In response to the SEC's concern regarding pension funds, the
dissent points out that only one percent of the $6.4T in U.S. pension funds
is currently invested in hedge funds, and that pension fund investments are
only eight percent of total hedge fund investments. s l In fact, the dissent
argues that pension funds might actually invest more money in hedge funds
if registration is required, as they tend to limit hedge fund investments to
those with registered advisers8 2
4. The Inadequacy of Current Regulation of Hedge Fund Advisers
The current program does not give the SEC the ability to deter or
detect fraud by unregistered advisers.83 The SEC currently relies almost
completely on enforcement actions after fraud has occurred. 4 In addition,
the SEC lacks basic information about advisers and the hedge fund
industry, as third-party data often conflicts and is unreliable. 5 The SEC
77 Letter from Leon M. Metzger to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 15,
2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/lmmetzger09l504.pdf ("Letter from
Leon M. Metzger").
78 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72093.
79 Letter from Madison Capital Management, LLC, supra note 23.
80 See Testimony of Charles J. Gradante, Managing Principal, The Hennessee Group
LLC, Address Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
(July 15, 2004), available at http://banking.senate.gov/ files/gradante.pdf, at 22.
8! Press Release, Greenwich Associates, Alternative Investments May Disappoint
Dabblers (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://www.greenwich.com.
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believes that registration of hedge fund advisers is the best way to both
deter fraud and collect basic information on the hedge fund industry.
6
5. Role of the SEC
The SEC is the federal agency with the principal responsibility for
enforcement and administration of federal securities laws and supervision
of the securities markets8 7  The authority provided by federal securities
laws permits the SEC to adopt rules and interpret statutes. 88 The federal
securities laws call for the SEC to provide for the transparency of markets,
prohibit fraud, impose fiduciary obligations,8 9 and encourage formation and
efficient allocation of capital and participation of investors in capital
markets. 90 Conversely, several commentators argue that the SEC should
have worked with the President's Working Group on Financial Markets as a
collaborative effort as opposed to unilaterally requiring the registration of
hedge fund advisers. 91
D. Expected Benefits of Registration
1. Census Information
Registered advisers must now file Form ADV, the adviser
registration form, which provides the data and information needed for the
SEC to better understand the operation of hedge fund advisers, plan
examinations, better develop regulatory policy, and provide data and
information to Congress and other government agencies. 92  Such
information includes: (1) the number of hedge funds managed by advisers;
(2) the amount of assets in hedge funds; (3) the number of employees and
types of other clients the advisers have; (4) the other business activities they
conduct; and (5) the identity of persons that control or are affiliated with the
firm.93  Alternatives for the SEC in gathering this information include
relying on a coordinated collection of filings and transaction reports
86 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72059-60.87 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72059.
88 See American Trucking Assos., Inc. v. Atchison, T & S.F.R. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 415
(1967).
89 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963).90 See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 217 (2nd Cir. 2000).
91 See, e.g, Letter from U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s73004/sbhruskal02204.pdf (Letter from the CFTC).
92 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72061.
93 Id.
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currently made.94 Although information is not currently in one convenient
place, other regulators have offered to share information with the SEC.95 As
another alternative to registration, the SEC could obtain useful information
by monitoring transactions of prime brokers.96 Other commentators have
also voiced concerns about duplicative regulation, as some hedge fund
advisers are already registered with other regulatory bodies. 97
The SEC argues that these alternative means of collecting
information would be too time-consuming and would still give an
incomplete picture of each adviser and the industry as a whole. 98 For
example, under any of these alternatives, the SEC still would not know how
many hedge funds, advisers, or aggregate hedge fund assets were in
existence. 99 Several commentators proposed an annual census or expanded
Form D1 00 reporting for unregistered advisers, but the SEC refused these
approaches because both lack an examination component.101
2. Keeping Unfit Persons from Using Hedge Funds to Perpetrate
Fraud
A component of the new rule denies registration to an adviser who
has been convicted of a felony in the last ten years or has had a disciplinary
record subjecting them to disqualification. 10 2 This will be accomplished by
94 See, e.g, Letter from Chamber of Commerce, supra note 24.
95 Letter from the CFTC, supra note 92; Letter from the National Futures Association to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 14, 2004), available at
http: //www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/djrothO91404.pdf.
96 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Written Responses to Questions
from Chairman Shelby in Connection with Testimony Before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (July 20, 2004).
97 Letter from the CFTC, supra note 92; Letter from the European Commission to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/dwright09l504.pdf.
98 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72061; see also Letter from Long Trail Capital, LLC to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/s73004-50.pdf.
99 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72061.
100 Notice of Sale of Securities Pursuant to Regulation D, Section 4(6), and/or Uniform
Limited Offering Exemption.
101 Letter from the American Bar Association, Section of Business Law to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s73004/aba092804.pdf; Letter from the Chamber of Commerce, supra note
24.
102 Item 11 of Part 1 of Form ADV requires applicants for registration as an investment
adviser to report felonies and other disciplinary events occurring during the last ten
years.
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self-reporting on Form ADV and by an SEC staff check against a database
of securities violators. 0 3 The intent of this component is to keep fraudsters,
scam artists, and others out of the hedge fund industry, fearing that a lack of
scrutiny in the past has likely attracted scam artists to hedge funds.
10 4
3. Deterrence of Fraud
Registration permits the SEC to conduct examinations to "identify
compliance problems at an early stage, identify practices that may be
harmful to investors, and provide a deterrent to unlawful conduct."10 5
Examinations are a key part of the investor protection plan and a major
reason the SEC is adopting this rule. 10 6 Examinations are similar to a tax
audit in that they are infrequent but are still intended to deter unlawful
behavior.' 0 7 Consequences of violations upon examination include fines,
disgorgement, industry suspension or bars, and loss of reputation.ls
Some commentators believe that in the hedge fund context, routine
examinations will not be an effective tool for the SEC because of the
limited number of examiners, the substantial training costs for the SEC, and
the slow examination cycle of the SEC. 10 9 They assert that any potential
deterrent effect of examinations by the SEC will be muted by the SEC's
lack of necessary resources.' 0 But the SEC indicates as evidence of the
effectiveness of examinations that in five of the eight cases brought against
registered advisers in 2005, examination uncovered the fraud.111 Other
commentators agreed that random monitoring does in fact create a deterrent
effect. ' 2
Opposing commentators also voice concern that examiners will not
understand the complex trading strategies and investments of hedge fund
103 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72063.
104 id.





109 Letter from W. Hardy Callcott, Bingham McCutchen LLP to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s73004/whcallcott09l504.pdf.
110 Testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the
Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations (Mar. 31, 2004).
I Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72062.
112 Letter from Alternative Investment Group Service, LP to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary of the SEC (Aug. 20, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s73004/s73004-37.pdf; Letter from Vantis Capital Management, LLC to
Robert E. Plaze, Associate Director of the SEC (Aug. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/s73004-31.pdf.
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advisers, rendering the examiners ineffective and inefficient. 1 3  Alan
Greenspan has echoed this concern, indicating that any possible detection of
trading irregularities is likely to only be of historic interest because by the
time of detection, hedge funds would have long since moved on to different
strategies.114  The SEC currently oversees a significant number of hedge
fund advisers, however, and from this experience the SEC has found that
fraud actions brought against hedge fund advisers are similar to those
brought against other types of advisers.' 5 In both cases, common actions
include the misappropriation of assets, portfolio pumping,
misrepresentation of portfolio performance, falsification of experience,
credentials and past returns, misleading disclosure regarding trading
strategies, and improper valuation of assets.' 16
The dissent further claims that the mutual fund market timing
scandal is evidence that registration and threat of examination are not an
effective deterrent to fraud because that examination did not uncover the
illegal conduct despite that all mutual fund advisers involved were
registered and that twenty of the seventy hedge fund advisers involved were
registered. 1 7  The SEC argues that just because registration and
examination do not prevent all fraud does not mean that we should not have
them at all."'
Several commentators argue that the hedge fund industry is already
a highly legitimate and professional industry with financially sophisticated
investors who can evaluate matters such as management fees, leverage, and
investment risk on their own behalf.11 9 Hedge fund investors can and do
perform due diligence (or hire someone to do it for them), review audit
reports or third-party internal control reports, and enlist help if they suspect
fraud or malfeasance.12  Moreover, hedge fund investors have been able,
through private ordering, to negotiate adequate protections for themselves
(protections at least as effective as SEC oversight), and market pressures are
113 See, e.g, Letter from Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
of the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73004/schulteO91504.pdf.
114 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Testimony Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (July 20, 2004).115 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72062.
116 id
117 See, e.g., Letter from Millrace Asset Group to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the
SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/
djhammond091504.pdf.
118Id
119 S. Rep. No. 104-293, at 10 (1996).
120 Letter from W. Hardy Callcott, supra note 110.
104 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 1:87
JOURNAL
enhancing investor protection as reflected in the increasing percentage of
hedge funds that are audited or rely on third-party administration.' 2 '
In response to this argument, the SEC asserts that although the
hedge fund industry has historically been limited to highly sophisticated
investors, the trend towards the retailization of hedge funds is inevitable
and has already begun in the United States. 122 As less-sophisticated
investors increasingly seek access to hedge fund investments, the SEC has
an obligation to protect such investors from the inherent risks and fee
structures of hedge funds. 1
23
4. Adoption of Compliance Controls
The 2003 Staff Hedge Fund Report indicated that some hedge fund
managers have very informal controls, which is a concern to the SEC, to
hedge fund investors, and to institutional investors. 124 The SEC feels that it
is in the best position to determine what constitutes a satisfactory
compliance infrastructure.1 25 This aspect of the new rule requires advisers
to designate a Chief Compliance Officer ("CCO") and to adopt policies and
procedures (compliance infrastructure) sufficient to prevent violation of the
Advisers Act.
Opposing commentators are concerned about the cost of the
compliance infrastructure and of submitting to compliance examinations,
and they believe that the required registration will have a detrimental effect
on the industry and may lead to the closing of many small advisers. 126 The
SEC argues that the costs of compliance will be reasonable, especially in
light of the substantial cash flow provided to hedge fund advisers by their
typical fee structure (two percent management fee and twenty percent
performance fee). 127  Moreover, many registered investment advisers
manage comparable amount of assets, charge much lower fees, and bear the
same compliance costs.
The SEC estimates that it will cost an average of $20,000 in
professional fees and $25,000 in internal costs per year to develop a
121 Letter from the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 24; Letter from Price Meadows
Incorporated to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the S.E.C. (Sept. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/price091 504.pdf.
122 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72057.
123 Id. at 72059.
124 Staff Report, supra note 66, at 110.
125 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72063.
126 See Letter from Madison Capital, supra note 23, at 3-5; Letter from Seward & Kissel
LLP to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/poglincoO9l5O4.pdf.
127 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72064.
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compliance infrastructure for hedge fund advisers based on its discussions
with industry experts and attorneys who counsel advisers. 28  Not
surprisingly, commentators estimate that the costs of compliance will be
considerably higher.
129
E. Costs of Registration
The SEC asserts that fears of registration inhibiting fund advisers
from engaging in complex or innovative strategies for fear of being second-
guessed by the SEC examination staff are refuted by the experience of
registered hedge fund advisers. 130 For example, "[r]egistration [does] not
require hedge fund advisers to reveal their trading strategies, disclose their
portfolio holdings, [] interfere in any way with their ability to leverage their
portfolios, ... [or] restrict the ability of hedge funds to provide liquidity to
the market. 13 1 A recent study found that there was no difference between
the performances of funds managed by registered advisers versus those
managed by unregistered advisers, 32 and that five of the ten largest hedge
fund advisers are registered. 133 The fact that over 8,500 advisory firms
(managing over $23T in assets) are registered under the Advisers Act is
evidence that registration is not a competitive disadvantage.
Nevertheless, the dissent maintains that this rule will divert already
stretched resources from over 90 million mutual fund investors to an
estimated 200,000 hedge fund investors. 134  Other commentators voice
concern that the SEC's cost-benefit analysis is not realistic and that costs of
compliance will inevitably be considerably higher than those predicted by
the SEC.135
F. Alternatives to Mandatory Registration
It is likely that the courts will find that the SEC has the authority to
make the new rule requiring the registration of hedge funds. In the absence
of an airtight argument that the new rule is contrary to the clear intent of
Congress, the courts are unlikely to interfere with the regulatory body
128 Proposed Release, supra note 64, at 45190.
129 See, e.g., Letter from Madison Capital, supra note 23, at 3-5.
130 See, e.g., Letter from Investment Company Institute to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
of the SEC (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/
erkrentzman091504.pdf.
131 Id.
132 Bids & Offers, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2004, at C4.
133 See The Hedge Fund 100, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 14, 2004.
134 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72094.
135 See, e.g., Letter from the Managed Funds Association, supra note 23, at 21.
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whose sole purpose is the enforcement and administration of federal
securities laws and supervision of the securities markets.
But the wisdom and effectiveness of the new rule is questionable.
If the SEC was primarily concerned about gaining information about the
hedge fund industry, other less intrusive means, such as an annual census,
could be used to gain such information without requiring registration. An
annual census would also allow the SEC to accomplish another of its
objectives: keeping unfit persons (those with a felony in the past ten years)
from managing hedge funds. In the comments received by the SEC in its
original investigation, few commentators raised any complaint regarding
either of these objectives of the SEC. Additionally, if only requiring an
annual census of hedge funds, the SEC would completely avoid the need to
alter the well-established interpretation of § 203(b)(3) of the Investment
Advisers Act.
Aside from merely collecting information on the hedge fund
industry, the SEC made it clear that it believed the examination component
to be an integral part of the new rule, 136 and it is primarily this component
that is so staunchly opposed by many in the hedge fund industry.
Particularly, with the requirement of certain compliance controls and the
designation of a compliance officer, the SEC seems to be micro-managing
highly capable and advanced investment advisers in an industry which is
dominated by highly sophisticated investors.
In response to this argument, the SEC argues that the threat of
retailization has changed the landscape of the industry 137 and that SEC
regulation is necessary to protect less-sophisticated investors who may
invest in hedge funds or funds of hedge funds. 38 Yet to the extent that
retailization of hedge funds is a concern to the SEC, an alternative to
registration is to bolster the minimum investment restrictions on those who
are permitted to invest in hedge funds. Many hedge fund participants at the
SEC Roundtable discussions expressed no desire or intent to offer their
investments to smaller, or retail, investors. 39 Other experts also argue that
the only way to protect smaller investors from the risks of hedge funds is to
prevent the retailization of hedge funds altogether.140 Maintaining, if not
bolstering, the minimum investment requirements could accomplish this for
hedge fund investors.
It is uncontested that hedge funds have a unique and valuable role
in the national economy and that the lack of regulatory restrictions on hedge
funds to date has played a role in encouraging the formation of large asset
136 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72061.
137 Id. at 72057.
138 Id. at 72058.
139 Id. at 72057.
140 See David F. Swensen, Invest at Your Own Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A21.
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pools which provide valuable liquidity to the national economy. 14 1 Thus, a
better alternative than registration would be for the SEC to: (1) gather basic
information on the hedge fund industry with an annual census and (2)
maintain and bolster the minimum investment requirements of hedge funds
to prevent the retailization of hedge funds in the United States. This
approach would permit the SEC to collect the information it seeks regarding
hedge fund advisers, protect smaller, less-sophisticated investors from the
risks and fee structures of hedge funds, and encourage valuable investment
in hedge funds in the United States by allowing the industry to continue
without further regulation by the SEC. Such a strategy would also alleviate
the need for an inconsistent interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act
and avoid the inherent inefficiencies of attempting to micro-manage an
extremely sophisticated industry.
Unfortunately, the course of the SEC appears to be set. Assuming
the courts permit the new rule, Christopher Cox, the SEC's new chairman,
said recently that he does not intend to overturn the policy initiatives of his
predecessor, William Donaldson, including the new hedge fund rule.
142
As the new rule goes into effect, it is likely that the new era of the
hedge fund industry will begin with more of a mild groan than a raucous
uproar. After all, the mutual fund industry has survived, and arguably
prospered, over a stretch of many years while registered with the SEC.
Undoubtedly, many previously unregistered hedge fund advisers will be
frustrated over the additional time, expense, and energy devoted to the
registration process, compliance guidelines, and SEC examinations. But
perhaps more importantly, mandatory registration of hedge funds is likely
to have a net effect of encouraging investors to organize or invest in hedge
funds overseas rather than the United States to avoid SEC regulation.
Considering that many experts believe that SEC regulation, for a
number of reasons, is unlikely to be highly effective in preventing fraud in
the hedge fund industry, it seems likely that SEC registration will do more
harm than good. The empirical results may be difficult to quantify, and it
may be years before the final verdict is in as to the net benefit or detriment
of the new rule. But in the meantime, United States hedge fund advisers
must prepare for a new regime-that of registration with the SEC.
Yet despite the recent debate surrounding the new registration rule
of the SEC, hedge fund advisers are not sitting around waiting for SEC
registration. Hedge fund advisers are continually inventing new investment
strategies to increase fund performance. An example of a new and
controversial strategy being utilized by hedge fund advisers is an "activist
event driven" strategy, which is analyzed in detail in the following section.
141 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72054, at 72059.142 Labaton, supra note 1.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM ON CORPORATE
DECISION-MAKING
A. Introduction
This section analyzes the legal path taken by hedge fund managers
to bring about corporate changes, such as stock repurchases, increased
distributions, and asset spin-offs.1 43 The path supports a contention that, as
a result of the circumvention of the shareholders' rights plan (commonly
referred to as a "poison pill"), 144 there exists no substantial barrier
preventing activist hedge fund managers to successfully influence corporate
change. Moreover, when influences are ineffective to get the board to
comply, a proxy contest is the tool to bring changes in both management
and corporate policy. 145
Hedge fund advisers have used a variety of investment techniques
to provide absolute returns to an investor, regardless of the stock or bond
market environment. 146  One such technique is the aptly titled "event
driven" category of hedge fund investing.147 These funds attempt to profit
through investing in securities of companies where significant corporate
changes are affecting the value of the corporation, such as bankruptcies,
reorganizations, and mergers. 148
This technique of investing is not unique in theory, but the manner
in which certain event driven hedge fund managers put theory into practice
differs significantly from investors of the past. 149 For clarity, this Note will
refer to this style of hedge fund activity as activist event driven ("AED")
hedge funds. 50 The managers of these hedge funds are the catalysts for the
corporate change from which they hope to profit. Similar to investment
143 See Steven Gray, Activist Investor to Offer New Plan for McDonald's, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 2006, at B 11; see also McDonald's Shares Rise; hedge fund investment
rumored, AFX INTERNATIONAL Focus, Sept. 16, 2005; see also Barnet D. Wolf,
Wendy's to Split with Tim Hortons; Initial Sale qf Small Stake to Be Followed by
Chain's Spinoff within Two Years, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 30, 2005, at 01D.
144 Brian J. McTear, Comment, Has the Evolution of the Poison Pill Come to an End?
Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.; Mentor Graphics, Inc. v. Quickturn Design Systems,
Inc., 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 881, 882 (1999).
145 E.g., Erica Laudano, Note and Comment, One Man's Junk Mail Is Another Man's
Treasure: Proxy Contests and Corporate Governance, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 430, 431
(2004).
146 See generally Adel A. A1-Sharkas, The Return in Hedge-Fund Strategies, INT. J. OF
Bus., 10(3) (2005), at 222, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id-778404.
147 E.g., Working Group, supra note 7, at 3.
148 Id.
149 See Riva D. Atlas, Some Funds Taking Role Far Beyond Just Investor, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2005, at C1.
150 ,
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targeting leveraged buy-out ("LBO") firms used in the 1980s, most AED
hedge fund managers today are looking to invest in undervalued 5 , or
mismanaged corporations, create change, and thus bring value to their
investment. 52  As long as the SEC does not attempt to regulate this
conduct, the highly liquid hedge funds will have a substantial impact upon
the management of American corporations. To that end, future hedge fund
managers will not be prevented from such conduct unless prevented by
means of a negative market reaction or by SEC involvement.
As mentioned above, AED hedge funds have begun to employ a
more aggressive investment strategy, where successful investment is reliant
upon the fund manager's activism as a shareholder of the corporation.
53
Ideally, the fund manager will propose corporate conduct that will make the
investment profitable and create value for the company. In other words,
both the corporate policy and the long-term strategy are changed when the
corporate board adopts the hedge fund manager's plan to maximize
shareholder value. 154  This technique has not proven to exist without
challenge. 155 In many situations, the board has been reluctant to accept the
fund manager's advice on how to best manage the corporation to maximize
shareholder value. 56 When a board disagrees with a fund manager's views
the fund manager may engage in a proxy contest. 57 If successful, this
move replaces incumbent directors with people who share the fund
manager's view on how to restructure the company.151
In the past two decades there have emerged several popular
methods of applying pressure to incumbent management of a corporation.
151 "Undervalued" means there is a positive difference between the intrinsic value of the
firm and the market value of the total stocks.
152 Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Be Prepared for Attacks by
Hedge Funds (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/
pdfs/wlrk122205-02.pdf (The first issue of the document refers to poor performance
being the reason for management to be wary of hedge fund activity in the company's
stock).
153 Atlas, supra note 150 ("[A] growing number of hedge fund managers have taken up
... tactics to wage populist battles against chief executives.").
154 See id
155 See Barnett D. Wolf, Investor Call to Restructure; Wendy's Won't Bow to Pressure,
THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 17, 2005, at 01G.
156 See generally id (setting forth the proposition that Wendy's disagreed with the
Pershing Square Capital Management's idea of what was best for Wendy's
shareholders).
157 See Blockbuster Inc., Schedule 13D/A (Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/921669/000092847505000118/blockbusterl3d-428.txt, Exhibit 1
for a description of why the hedge funds wished to participate in a proxy contest.
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There was the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s," 9 followed by the
increased use of proxy contests of the 1990s."6 AED hedge funds are the
newest vehicles for aggressive investing through management pressure. 6
As such, they are faced with the same obstacles that the corporate raiders
and shareholder activists faced in the 1980s and 1990s.
Corporate "raiders" of the '80s (a.k.a. LBOs) were financial firms
that used significant debt (leverage) to acquire a target company. 62 After
the acquisition was complete, the raider would recapitalize or reorganize the
target firm's capital structure for two reasons: first, to pay off the debt used
for the acquisition and second, to turn the company into a more profitable
business. 63 Due to changes made in most state corporate codes, hostile
LBO firms are no longer able to employ this investment style. 64  The
hostile LBO firms targeted corporations in much the same way as AED
hedge funds, in that they sought out firms which they thought could be
improved through structural or policy changes. 165 LBO firms from the past,
however, were distinct from AED hedge funds today in one major way.
LBO firms operated through the acquisition of the entire target
corporation. 166
Many corporations adopted poison pill plans, and many state
legislatures adopted anti-takeover statutes to decrease a corporation's
susceptibility to confrontation from an unwanted acquirer.16  The two
devices mentioned above neither deter nor affect an investor or a group of
investors who never cross a certain threshold of ownership in the
corporation.1 68  The mechanics of poison pill plans and anti-takeover
statutes are not effective when there is no acquiring entity. For example,
159 See Guhan Subramanian, A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal
Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 375, 376
(1998).
160 See Laudano, supra note 146.
161 See e.g., Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 153.
162 See DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND AQUISITIONS 621 (1991).
163 See id at 277.
164 See id at 602 n.110. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991) (prohibiting any
merger or sale of assets within three to five years after the bidder acquires a triggering
percentage oftarget's shares-a "business combination" statute)).
165 See OESTERLE, supra note 163, at 621.
166 Id. at 273.
167 See Laudano, supra note 146, at 430 ("In the 1990s, these negative attitudes towards
proxy contests changed. With the widespread adoption of poison pills, the proliferation
of state anti-takeover laws, and the relative unavailability of financing for financially
motivated hostile takeovers, proxy contests became an important tool by which
potential acquirers could facilitate hostile takeovers").
168 Shareholder's Rights Plans require a certain percentage of a class's outstanding
stock to be beneficially owned by a "person" before the Rights Plan vests. The
Delaware Business Combination Statute does not allow the acquirer of at least eighty-
five percent of a corporation's voting stock to combine the corporation with another
entity for a period of three years. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (2005).
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Business Combination Statutes (adopted during the 1980s) only prevent
takeovers if the acquiring entity wishes to merge or divest part of the target
company once acquired. 169 Since AED hedge funds have no intention of
acquiring legal or effective control of the company, the funds' conduct is
outside the scope of the state of incorporation's business combination
statutes. Nevertheless, poison pills still remain a legitimate obstacle to
corporate takeovers. 170
The next section outlines hedge fund investor activism, while
Section C discusses methods of avoiding the poison pill and using a proxy
contest to bring about change. Section D provides conclusions and
proposals regarding future regulations affecting hedge funds.
B. Hedge Fund Activism
AED hedge fund managers have begun to employ a novel technique
to exploit profitable transactions. These funds, through their own analysis,
decide to take large positions in a company's equity. In the opinion of
the fund manager, the target corporation's stock has been trading lower than
its potential intrinsic value.17  In order for the particular company to
become a target of hedge fund activism, the fund manager must both
recognize that the stock is undervalued by the market as well as believe that
a change can be made to effectively increase the company's market
value.
173
Once a fund manager targets an undervalued company (or a
company which contains an undervalued asset) and decides upon the way in
which its share value can reflect the company's intrinsic value, the
opportunistic fund manager begins to quietly purchase as many of the
169 Implied in anti-takeover statutes is the desire of the bidding entity to take over
ownership or control of the target corporation. These state statutes require the bidder to
obtain approval from the target board prior to attempting a takeover. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2005). Without board approval, the bidder is subject to the effects of
the statute.
170 See Jenny Anderson, When Winning the Battle Leads to Losing the War, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2005, at C7 (describing a hedge fund's raid, proxy contest, and deactivation of
BKF Capital Group's poison pill).
171 See Wendy's International Inc., Schedule 13D (Apr. 18, 2005), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 105668/000110465905018018/a05-
7319 lscl3d.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
172 See generally Atlas, supra note 150 (describing hedge fund manager's effort to
spearhead the "shareholder activism" movement against underperforming
management); see also BODIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 609 ("[i]ntrinsic value" of a
"share of stock is defined as the present value of all cash payments to the investor in the
stock, including dividends as well as the proceeds from the ultimate sale of the stock,
discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted interest rate").
173 See e.g., Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 153.
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firm's stocks as he can for the lowest possible cost.1 74 The reason the fund
manager wishes to purchase shares quietly is to avoid a price impact from
large bulk purchases. 17  The fund manager will continue to quietly
purchase the target firm's stocks until the fund owns five percent of a
specific class of the firm's stocks. The fund can then purchase as many
securities as it desires within the next ten days before it is required by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to file a Schedule 13D with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.176
1. Schedule 13D
The rule 13(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires,
[a]ny person . . . acquiring directly or indirectly the
beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class ... of
more than 5 per centum of the class shall, within ten days
after such acquisition ... file with the Commission [SEC],
a statement containing such of the following information..
as the Commission may by rules and regulations,
prescribe as necessary or appropriate...
177
With that authority, the SEC promulgated the required filing of forms
Schedule 13D or 13G that disclose the five percent investor's holdings in
the issuer and purpose for the purchases. 78 This rule gives a person who
would normally file a Schedule 13D the option of filing form 13G if"[s]uch
person has acquired such securities in the ordinary course of his business
and not with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the
control of the issuer, nor in connection with or as a participant in any
transaction having such purpose or effect. ' ,17 9 Because the intentions of the
fund managers are to influence the issuer, the AED fund manager files a
Schedule 13D instead of 13G.'8 0 Notice that the hedge fund manager does
174 The term "undervalued" is meant to encompass corporations which can increase
their value through changing certain corporate policies to unlock optimal value per
share.
175 See Subramanian, supra note 160.
176 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-I(a) (2006).
177 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2006).
178 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-I(a)-(b) (2006).
179 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(1)(i) (2006).
180 See Wendy's International Inc., Schedule 13D (Apr. 18, 2005), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 105668/000110465905018018/aO5-
7319 _scl 3d.htm; Wendy's International Inc., Schedule 13D (Dec. 6, 2005), available
at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105668/000095011705004693/a40992.htm;
Star Gas Partners, L.P., Schedule 13D (Apr. 6, 2005), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 1002590/000089914005000357/t2820161.txt;
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not intend to "effect the change" nor "influence the control of the issuer"
per se, but rather, the manager intends to persuade the management of the
target firm to perform differently so as to maximize share value. ",' It would
be remiss, however, to say that the fund manager is not intending on
"influencing the control" or "effecting the change" of the firm should the
directors of the target firm not submit to the fund manager's requests. 
8 2
Unfortunately, the SEC has not offered a definition of the elastic
"influencing control" concept.18 3  Furthermore, there are no cases that
construe Schedule 13G eligibility, suggesting that shareholders have not
tried to use the Schedule 13G when they might want to pursue any effort to
nominate and elect directors.1 84 The nonuse of the Schedule 13G under
these circumstances implies that when a Schedule 13D is filed, as opposed
to Schedule 13G, notice is given to the market and the issuer's management
that the investor is positioned to influence the control of the corporation.
Typically, around the time of the fund filing a Schedule 13D, the
manager writes a list of demands to the board of directors.' 5 The demands
are usually included as an exhibit to the Schedule 13D filing.18 6 In some
instances, the manager attempts to meet with the board for an opportunity to
formally present the fund's proposals of how the company can maximize
shareholder value.1 87 The fund manager justifies such conduct by playing
the role of a concerned stakeholder in an underperforming company.188
Blockbuster Inc., Schedule 13D (Apr. 6, 2005), available at
http: //sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/9190851000116923205002092/d63342 scl3d.txt;
OfficeMax Incoporated, Schedule 13D (Feb. 23, 2005), available at http://sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/12978/000110465905008403/a05-4227 lscl3d.htm; OfficeMax
Incorporated, Schedule 13D (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data112978/000091412106000046/kc723026-13da7.txt.
181 See Wendy's International Inc., Schedule 13D, at Item 4 (Dec. 6, 2005), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105668/000095011705004693/a40992.htm.
182 See Wendy's International Inc., Schedule 13D, at Exhibit 2, Provision 2 of the
Recitals (Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
105668/000095011705004693/ex2.htm.
183 See Bernard S. Black, Article, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 545 (1990).
184 [d.
185 See OfficeMax Incorporated, Fund manager's list of requests, at Exhibit 2 (Oct. 26,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12978/
000089534505001050/jbl3daex2.txt; Wendy's International Inc., Schedule 13D, at




18 See Wendy's International Inc., Schedule 13D, at Item 4 (Apr. 18, 2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105668/000110465905018018/a05-
7319 1 sci 3d.htm (suggesting that no action will be taken unless the shareholder thinks
the company is underperforming).
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2. Misconceptions of the "Group" Classification
There have been many publications about AED hedge funds
working in undisclosed groups dubbed "wolf packs" in order to influence
corporate management. 19 Current speculation concerning activist hedge
funds purports that one fund is used to lead the effort while other funds
support the effort without disclosing their involvement. 190 There is no
empirical data supporting this proposition. SEC Schedule 13D filings
suggest this is true to the degree that some activist hedge funds invest
together,' 9' but the implied proposition that more funds were working
together than were disclosed 192 is unlikely accurate. For the following
reasons, it makes little sense that AED hedge funds would operate in a
collusive syndicate without disclosure in order to influence corporate
changes: (1) if hedge funds were working together they would be required
to disclose this fact within the 13D filing once the sum of the funds'
beneficial ownership has crossed the five percent marker in order to comply
with SEC regulations; 193 (2) the filing fund will have enough support in
proxy contest without having a collusive syndicate of hedge funds as long
as the filing fund's desired structural changes will increase the value of the
corporation; 94 (3) the filing fund stands to make greater profits without
other hedge funds acting as competing bidders for a company's stock;195
and (4) it is unnecessary for the fund to have commitment from other funds
prior to the proposition of their corporate restructuring plan. 1
96
The Securities Exchange Act refers to any group of "two or more
persons act[ing] as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other
group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an
189 See Phyllis Plitch, Lawyers See No Poison Pill To Feed Hedge Fund 'Wolf Packs',
Dow JONES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, at 4, Dec. 21, 2005.
190 See Phyllis Plitch, Hedge Funds Find Cure For Poison Pill: Teamwork, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 20, 2005, at C3, (citing Martin Lipton, who is credited for inventing the poison
pill).
191 E.g., Schedule 13D, supra note 181, at cover page 2a.
192 See Phyllis Plitch, supra note 190.
193 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §13(d)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)
(2004).
194 Investors in the subject corporation have an interest in increasing the economic value
of the corporation. Therefore, shareholders are more likely to vote in favor of
management who will enforce policy most likely to increase the value of the
corporation.
195 Price impact is a popularly recognized affect of large stock purchases. The
occurrence of a large stock purchase can result in a temporarily inflated asking price for
the stock. The same result will occur when there is great demand for a specific stock.
Asking price will increase while demand increases until the market for the stock reaches
equilibrium.
196 This assumes no fund-of-funds are limited partners or member investors in the filing
fund.
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issuer ... shall be deemed a 'person' for the purposes of this subsection.
1 97
"The Commission defines 'group' to include 'two or more persons [who]
agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting, or
disposing of equity securities.' . . . [A] 'group' can be formed informally,
without written documentation." 198 As the Second Circuit has stated, "the
touchstone of a group within the meaning of Section 13(d) is that the
members combined in furtherance of a common objective." 199 Although the
Second Circuit did not discuss whether a group could be formed without
any communication between the investors, the facts of the case required
analysis on whether the agreement had to be express or implied between the
investors. 200 For purposes of determining a "group of investors" for a
Schedule 13D, it seems unlikely any investors that have not been in
communication with each other could be construed as being "members of a
group. 201 Otherwise, "furtherance of a common objective" would be broad
enough to require all investors agreeing on any change in corporate policy
to file a Schedule 13D regardless of whether their purpose for investing was
to effect or influence the issuer. That said, should the activist hedge funds
communicate with one another to establish a strategy about a specific
company and not disclose that they were part of a group at the time of filing
a Schedule 13D form, the filing fund would be subject to § 15(c)(4) or §
21(a) proceedings at the discretion of the SEC.20 2
C. The Impotence of the Shareholders' Rights Plan and Why Proxy
Contests Have Been Successful
In many of the cases that have occurred over the previous year, the
boards have not immediately agreed with the fund manager's proposals.2 3
In extreme circumstances, a member of the board may comment publicly
through a press release or interview as to why the board disagrees with the
204 205proposal.2 °4 Interference with a long-term strategy, unwanted effects on
corporate cash flow, and disagreement concerning forecasts are some
197 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2004).
198 Black, supra note 184, at 543.
199 Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d. 355, 363 (2nd Cir. 1982).
200 See id
201 SEC Schedule 13D Form Cover Page, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfinlforms/13d.htm.
202 See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 202-03 (Foundation Press 2005). (Only after the "person" or issuer has been
found to violate § 15(c)(4) can the SEC request a court order compelling obedience).
203 For an example see Wolf, supra note 156.204 See Wolf, supra note 156; see also Blockbuster's response to Carl Ichan's demands
on the board as an example of public disagreement by the board, available at
http://www.hackingnetflix.com/2005/04/blockbusterre.html.
205 Id.
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reasons why a board of directors would choose not to implement a hedge
fund manager's proposal.
Once the fund manager's proposal has been denied, the fund
manager has two options: sell the fund's stake in the company or influence
corporate governance. Because the fund manager still believes that the
company is undervalued, the fund manager is unwilling to sell the fund's
stake in the company without having realized profit on the investment.
Therefore, the AED hedge fund manager will choose to influence corporate
governance of the company.
The major way a shareholder can influence corporate governance is
206through gaining a presence on the board of directors z. This is best done
through a successful proxy contest. 207 Thus, the proxy contest has become
the tool used by AED hedge funds to impose their views upon unwilling
boards.2 °8
1. Proxy Contest
Owning a share of corporate common stock conveys three rights on
the owner: (1) the right to convey a return on investment; (2) the right to
receive a proportionate interest as a residual claimant of the corporation;
and (3) the right to vote.2 °9  Shareholders that cannot attend the annual
meeting can proxy their vote through a proxy-holder who represents the
shareholder and votes in the manner granted by the shareholder's
preference. 210  The Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a)
allowed the SEC to make "rules governing the solicitation of proxies 'as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.', 211 The rules promulgated by the SEC require persons soliciting
proxy to vote for an alternate management slate to furnish shareholders with
a proxy statement prior to or concurrent to solicitation (14a-3), and the
statement must have been pre-filed with the SEC (14a-6). 212 The SEC rules
also allow a shareholder in opposition to incumbent directors the right to
206 See Laudano, supra note 146, at 444.
207 Id.
208 See Blockbuster Inc., Schedule 13D/A, at exhibit 1, (Apr. 28, 2005), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000092847505000118/blockbuster13d-
428.txt.
209 Laudano, supra note 145, at 432. Due to Federal Securities Law and State Fiduciary
Duty Law directors are substantially limited on restraining shareholder voting.
210 See Tara L. C. Van Ho, Comment and Case Note, Reconstructing the Marriage of
Ownership and Control: Is the SEC Missing an Important Step in its Hesitancy to Adopt
Proposed Rule 14A-I?, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2005).
211 Laudano, supra note 146, at 433 (describing the rule making power of the SEC as
enacted in the 1934 Act). 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
212 ,
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obtain a list of shareholders from management or to have management mail
the dissident's proxy materials to the shareholders, either of which to be
done at the expense of the dissident shareholder.2 13  The final SEC
requirement relevant to proxy contests of hedge funds is the obligation to
promote candid truthful disclosure in the proxy statement (14a-9).2 14
2. Analysis: Why Proxy Contests Have Been and Will Continue to
be Successful
Even though the hedge fund manager is confident the corporation
could realize greater value for its stockholders, this does not mean that
compliance with the fund manager's suggestions is in the best interest of
the corporation. It is important to understand why hedge fund managers
have been successful in proxy contests.2 15
Many hedge fund strategies, by their nature, rely on short-term
216investments. In the past, proxy contests have resulted in increased gain
to shareholders of the firm.2 7 Thus, speculative short-term investors, such
as hedge funds reasonably view proxy contests as good short-term
investments.
Therefore, when a fund manager files a Schedule 13D with the
SEC, making his requests and intentions public, the rest of the market is on
notice that there is likely a proxy contest in the near future. Speculative
investors, such as other hedge funds, react to this news by buying shares of
the subject corporation. When the activist hedge fund makes the public
aware of its purchase and intention to have changes made, however, the
investment becomes too risky for many investors.
Uncertainty of a corporation's future returns is a common measure
218of risk. Whenever a corporation's management is in question, there is
uncertainty surrounding the firm's future performance. 219 As a result of this
213 [d.
214 id.
215 Examples of successful hedge fund proxy contests have occurred at TimeWarner,
BKF Capital, and Blockbuster Video.
216 See generally Adel A. AI-Sharkas, The Return in Hedge Fund Strategies, INT. J. OF
Bus., 10(3), 2005, at 221, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id-778404. All references to arbitrage opportunities support the assertion that many
hedge fund investing strategies are focused on short term as opposed to long term
investments.
217 See generally Laudano supra note 146 at 436 footnotes 21, 22. (citing Peter Dodd &
Jerold Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON.
401 (1983)); Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance
of Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29 (1989) (this proposition has been
well supported by empirical studies).
218 See BODIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 153.
219 See Laudano, supra note 146, at 436-38.
118 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 1:87
JOURNAL
uncertainty, the corporation becomes a more risky investment than some
traditional investors wish to bear. But because of hedge funds' investment
style, some funds are able to take on the additional risk for the opportunity
of greater profits.220  This phenomenon is largely a result of traditional
investors' unwillingness to increase the idiosyncratic risk contained in their
portfolio positions. 22 1 From the other vantage point, many hedge fund
strategies, such as long/short, take on the idiosyncratic risk that other
investors avoid, in hopes of a profit.222 As a consequence, ownership of the
stock of the subject firm is less appealing to many investors but very
appealing to some hedge funds. Once a shift in equitable ownership to
hedge funds has taken place, the new owners, consisting mainly of short-
term investors, have an incentive to support the proposals made by the five
percent shareholder. Bear in mind that even though the desires of the new
shareholders are probably in line with the changes demanded by the activist
hedge fund, they are unlikely members of an official group of investors.
For this reason, there should be no violation of the disclosure of five
percent beneficial ownership rule of § 13d-l(d), even if the pool of new
owners is composed predominantly of hedge funds.223
3. Shareholders' Rights Plan: The Poison Pill
Shareholders' rights plans were invented in the 1980s as a way to
prevent hostile takeovers.224  The shareholders' rights plan, known as a
poison pill,225 is the most prevalent anti-takeover device of American
220 See generally AI-Sharkas, supra note 217, at 222. (An increase in uncertainty of a
firm's future returns will increase the idiosyncratic risk of the firm and could increase
the idiosyncratic risk of the entire portfolio. Thus, a traditional investment approach
will require a change in the weights of the portfolio's asset allocation.)
221 See generally Suleyman Basak, Anna Pavlova & Alex Shapiro, Optimal Asset
Allocation and Risk Shifting in Money Management (Jan. 2006) available at SSRN id-
879294. The study analyzes influential factors of risk shifting behavior by mutual fund
managers. The authors state optimal asset allocation of many institutional investor's
means shifting positions of the portfolio to take on no idiosyncratic risk (firm specific).
Id. at 5. (Idiosyncratic risk being firm specific volatility).
222 See AI-Sharkas, supra note 217, at 222. (The reference is to unsystematic risk, which
is risk to a very small number of assets. This is essentially identical to idiosyncratic
risk, which is also risk from a small number of assets or, more precisely, firm specific
risk. Diversification can almost entirely eliminate unsystematic/idiosyncratic risk.)
223 The "group" classification of 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(J) has never been interpreted
broadly enough to consider investors similar, only in investing style, members of a
group.
224 See Shawn C. Lese, Note, Preventing Control From the Grave: A Proposal for
Judicial Treatment of Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2175,
2175 (1996).
225 Id.
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corporations.26 There are two basic forms of the poison pill, with many
possible variations. First, there is the "flip-in" form, most commonly used
by target firms through the distribution of a dividend to all common
shareholders pro rata. 7 What makes the dividend unique is that it contains
a right to purchase shares for a discount once the right vests. 28 Second,
there is the "flip-over" form of poison pill, which allows shareholders of the
target corporation to purchase a class of shares, usually common shares, in
the post acquisition corporation; the purchase price is at a steep discount in
the occurrence of a two-step or "squeeze-out" acquisition. ' 229 The "flip-
over" poison pill has no importance in this Note as it only affects post-
acquisition firms.
While the stock dividend (of the "flip-in" form of poison pill) gives
all shareholders (except the shareholder who crossed the ownership
threshold) considerable voting rights, it dilutes the ownership percentage of
230the aggressor. With the ownership of the aggressor diluted, the voting
rights of the hostile acquirer are insignificant.2 31 Thus, in a hostile LBO
takeover, "the dilution resulting from triggering either [form of poison pill]
makes a tender offer a prohibitively expensive method of acquisition.,
232
Activation of the pill was, in part, designed to dilute the voting shares so
that the aggressors attempting the LBO will no longer have enough voting
power to elect new board members who are supportive of their offer. Yet
this is not to say that, if triggered, a poison pill would necessarily prevent
an AED hedge fund manager from reaching the fund's objective. In the
past, it was believed that because "a hostile acquisitions cannot be
completed without triggering the rights plan, 'the raider cannot swallow up
the company without also ingesting the economic position represented by
the value that has to be delivered upon exercise of the rights.', 2 33 Today,
226 See OESTERLE, supra note 163, at 519. The assertion above incorporates the "poison
pill preferred," which is not specifically discussed in this Note, in conjunction with the
newer form of the poison pill, the shareholders' rights plan. The difference between the
shareholders' rights plan form and the poison pill preferred form of poison pill is that
the latter uses a preferred share distribution to all shareholders as opposed to the
dividend distribution of the former. The preferred shares attach to the common shares
and have no voting, dividend, or creditor claimant rights. Id. at 85. However, the
preferred shares do have a convertible feature which causes each share to "flip-in" to
multiple common shares if a large buyer of corporate common stock crosses an
ownership threshold without having board approval. Id.
227 Lese, supra note 225, at 2180.
228 id.
229 See Subramanian, supra note 160 at 397.
230 Lese, supra note 225, at 2188.
231 See McTear, supra note 145, at 886.
232 See Subramanian, supra note 160, at 397.
233 McTear, supra note 145, at 886 (quoting ARTHER FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R.
SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSES § 5.01[B] 5-7 (5th ed. Supp. 1997)).
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however, the poison pill is not effective at protecting the status quo of the
corporation against AED hedge funds.
4. Analysis: The Poison Pill's Hidden Weakness
The purpose of a poison pill plan is to protect stockholders from
coercive takeover tactics and to "mitigate against market accumulators who
through open market and/or private purchases may achieve a position of
substantial influence or control without paying to selling or remaining
stockholders a fair control premium., 234 Through the poison pill design,
common share certificates carry the unvested dividend right once the plan
has been adopted. The unique feature of the dividend becomes exercisable
upon the acquisition of beneficial ownership of more than a threshold
percentage of the company's outstanding stock.235 No AED hedge fund has
triggered a poison pill of a target corporation's stock over the last two
years.
Interestingly, AED hedge funds can approach the purchase of the
target corporation's stock differently. 236 Good examples of two different
approaches to investing AED fund's can take are the two funds that have
recently invested in Wendy's International Inc. ("Wendy's"). Pershing
Square Capital Management ("Pershing") took a long position 237 coupled
with call options in Wendy's common stock; alternatively, Trian Fund
Management ("Trian") bought call options while simultaneously selling put
238options along with taking a long position in Wendy's common stock.
This means that Trian had entered a contract to acquire an equal amount of
Wendy's stock whether the stock price went above or below the contracted
price.239 Pershing's long position had a combination of common shares and
234 See JEFFREY D. BAUMANN, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:
STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS 700 (West 2004).
231 State law in conjunction with the certificate of incorporation determines what the
percentage of beneficial ownership of common stock is for the Rights Plan to become
exercisable. Del. Gen. Corp. L. §§ 102(a)(4) & 151(a).236 This is evidenced by the divergent investment strategies summarized in Schedule
13D Item 5 for both Pershing Capital Management and Trian Fund Management,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105668/000110465905018018/a05-
7319 lscl3d.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2006), and http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data'
105668/000095011705004693/a40992.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2006) respectively.
237 "Long position" means the investment strategy was to purchase and hold the stock.
238 Schedules 13D, supra note 236.
239 Since the put contract allowed Trian the right to pay either "the product of the excess
between the [named] price above the closing price and the number of shares set forth [in
the contract]", "or acquire the number of shares [agreed upon]... at the price set forth
[in the contract]." Trian Fund Management Schedule 13D Item 5,
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105668/000095011705004693/a40992.htm. This
allows Trian to not necessarily acquire the shares if the closing price is below the
contract price.
2006] MANDA TORY REGISTRATION OF HEDGE FUNDS WITH 121
THE SEC AND HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN
CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING
call options on common shares. 240 This strategy had minimal downside risk
241protection. Possession of call options on a large percentage of common
shares owned by Pershing mitigated some risk exposure for the fund. If, for
some unforeseeable reason, the stock Pershing owned had substantially
decreased in value, Pershing could have chosen not to exercise the right to
purchase more common stock, resulting only in a loss of the premium paid
for the option and a loss on the value of the common stock.242 On the other
hand, Trian's options position allowed Trian the opportunity to profit from
its investment if three things occurred: (1) the market price of Wendy's
stock is in excess of the contracted price; (2) the excess is greater than the
price for the put option; and (3) upon execution of the call, Trian chose to
sell the acquired shares to the market. That said, Trian's long position in
Wendy's common stock was completely exposed to any downward
movement in the stock price.
Under both investing strategies, Pershing and Trian could have
accumulated more than a 9.9% stake in Wendy's. Arguably, both funds
could have accomplished their proposals, or won a proxy contest had they
triggered the poison pill. 243 Even if triggered, the result of the poison pill
would be a decrease in the triggering fund's voting rights, and an unknown
effect on the value of Wendy's common stock. Regardless of the change in
the share price, the fund manager's proposal could still gain popularity
among shareholders. With enough support, the triggering fund's insurgent
management slate could be voted onto the board. With the new make-up of
the board, the fund's proposal would be implemented, ideally resulting in
the increase in the value of the stock. Thus, if the market accepts the hedge
fund's objective, the poison pill has little to no effect.
Trian's options positions deserve further inspection. Trian would
only have to commit to a proxy contest if the share price was less valuable
than the put option price. This is because Trian would only have a losing
investment if the fund had been forced to buy Wendy's stock for a price in
excess of the market price. Before that, Trian had balanced its investment
through selling an identical amount in underlying shares through put
options as it had purchased in call options. Thus, Trian would only have
240 Pershing 13D, supra note 236 (look to item 5).
241 The downside risk the investor faces is the value of the stock decreasing.
242 See BODIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 699.
243 It is unknown by the author whether Wendy's International Inc. had a Shareholder's
Rights Plan in effect at the time of Pershing or Trian initial investments. This example
is used as a demonstration of how the Rights Plan could affect the hedge fund's
objective.
244 Trian 13D, supra note 236.
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an incentive to enter a proxy contest if it had acquired many shares in
Wendy stock for a loss.
245
An interesting twist to Tiran's investment in Wendy's would have
been if Trian had decided, instead of selling put options, to purchase into a
straddle. A straddle position means the fund manager has purchased the
same number of call options as put options, and that all of the options have
the same strike price and expiration date.246 The straddle investment would
allow Trian to make a profit as long as the price of Wendy's stock rises or
lowers enough to compensate Trian in excess of the price already paid for
both the call and the put options.2 4  For this strategy, Trian could only lose
248
money if there is little or no movement in the stock price.
Hypothetically, had Trian only invested in a straddle position it could profit
without concern for either a poison pill or proxy contest. Under this theory,
if Trian had exercised its call options it would have assumed a large enough
position to trigger a poison pill, and it would have been completely hedged
against any losses to the subsequent share price due to the hedge provided
by its put options.249 This strategy creates a disincentive to boards who
might consider using a poison pill in an attempt to deter activist hedge
funds: the board cannot predict with great certainty the true economic effect
activation of the pill has on share price. Thus, activist hedge funds could
seek large profits from stagnant stocks by purchasing a hedged straddle
cheaply, by taking advantage of the call and put options' low implied
volatility, 250 and merely proposing radical corporate change to increase
shareholder wealth.251  The result, regardless of the market reaction
(negative or positive) to the fund's proposal, would leave the fund with a
substantial profit.252 This could be done without the fund ever concerning
itself with the threat of the poison pill or ever having to take on the expense
of a proxy contest.
245 This assumes that the value of the purposed corporate changes to Wendy's is less
valuable than the profit Train would have realized on exercise of its call options.
246 Strike price is the price at which the holder has the right to, in the case of a call, buy
the underlying security, and in the case of a put, sell the underlying security. The
premium is the price paid for the option.
247 See e.g., BODIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 715.
248 id.
249 This example assumes both the call options are exercised prior to the expiration date
and that there are enough call options available to trigger a poison pill.
250 M. ANTHONY WONG, FIXED-INCOME ARBITRAGE 13 (John Wiley And Sons Inc.
1993).
251 This theory ignores potential l ob-5 liability for market manipulation.
252 This example assumes the fund has not misstated any public disclosures.
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D. Alternatives: SEC Regulation Which Would Enable Corporate
Managers to Deter AED Hedge Fund Conduct
Important issues surround the potential conduct of AED hedge
funds, as highlighted at the end of the last section. Is this "activist
behavior" appropriate or should there be SEC regulation governing AED
hedge fund conduct?
The proxy contest, regardless of who provides the insurgent
management slate, provides shareholders with an opportunity to expel
entrenched management. Given that the value of their shares depends upon
how well the corporation will be managed, it is appropriate to allow
shareholders to dictate whose policy they prefer by selecting board
members from either incumbent or insurgent board member lists.
Therefore, the proxy contest should not be changed through additional
regulation.
Poison pill plans are powerless as a threat to slow or stop AED
hedge funds from behaving the way they please. Furthermore, without an
effective way of preventing activist behavior, corporate boards have little
choice but to seriously consider the proposals made by the fund manager.
This leaves board members in a precarious position because they already
must maximize shareholder wealth, but if they disagree with a proposed
structural change that is favored by the shareholders, they face the
possibility of being removed from the board. In effect, this allows
shareholders to make the major strategic decisions previously entrusted to
the board.
Corporate management is neither able nor willing to substantially
limit the rights of their shareholders. Therefore, new SEC regulation or
market reactions are the only ways to prevent or change AED hedge fund
conduct. Should the SEC choose to restrain AED hedge fund activity by
burdening the hedge fund industry with regulation, the same conduct would
most likely be pursued, merely through a different means.
Alternatively, if the SEC were willing to limit the scope of its
current disclosure regulations, corporate management would be free to curb
AED hedge fund activity. Through an SEC amendment to Regulation FD,
corporate boards may have the flexibility to curtail fund conduct.253
Regulation FD prevents corporate management from making selective
disclosures of material non-public information to institutional investors.254
If the regulation were amended to allow corporate management to disclose
material non-public information to a substantial institutional shareholder,
corporate management could use non-public information as an affirmative
253 Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2004).
254 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) ("whenever an issuer.. discloses material nonpublic
information regarding that issuer.. to any [institutional investor] the issuer shall make
public disclosure of that information").
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defense to an AED hedge fund. Coupled with the SEC amendment, the
board must have the power to ratify the corporate bylaws under the state of
incorporation's corporate code.255 The ratification to the bylaws of the
corporation could include language requiring any substantial shareholder
making a formal proposal of a structural change to the corporation to
participate in the board meeting that followed the proposal(s). As long as
the information disclosed in the board meeting was material, the AED
hedge fund would not be able to actively trade in the securities of the
corporation until the material information was disclosed to the public.256
The proposed amendment to Regulation FD raises several additional
issues, including: is any potential harm caused by the changing of current
SEC regulation a justification for deterring AED hedge fund activity? Are
directors in breach of fiduciary duty for amending bylaws with the
intention of preventing activist fund/shareholder behavior? Finally, is a
temporary block on trading the target's securities enough to deter AED
hedge funds? Obviously, the proposed SEC conduct is not without issue; it
is meant as a mere demonstration of behavior the SEC could perform that
would impact activist hedge fund strategy.
V. CONCLUSION
The exponential growth of hedge funds has presented the SEC with
several difficult regulatory issues. The SEC's primary response to the
growth and retailization of hedge funds has been to require the registration
of hedge fund advisers. Innovative hedge fund investment strategies are
constantly evolving, however, which may present additional regulatory
challenges for the SEC, as evidenced by the activist event driven strategies
now being utilized by hedge fund advisers. One certainty is that the hedge
fund industry will continue to present challenges to Christopher Cox, the
new chairman of the SEC, as the commission begins the implementation of
hedge fund registration and attempts to keep pace with the ever evolving
investment strategies utilized by sophisticated and innovative hedge fund
advisers.
255 The Model Business Corporation Act and the General Corporate Law of Delaware
(as well as many states) already allow this conduct in sections 10.20 & 141,
respectively.256 Dirks v. Sec. Exch.Commn', 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
